

Sanitized Copy Approved for
Release 2011/06/28 :
CIA-RDP85T00875R00100001


Sanitized Copy Approved for
Release 2011/06/28 :
CIA-RDP85T00875R00100001

25X1

~~Secret~~



**DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE**



Intelligence Report

*The International Liaison Department
of the Chinese Communist Party*

(Reference Title: POLO XLIV)

~~Secret~~

December 1971

25X1

Page Denied

SECRET

25X1

THE INTERNATIONAL LIAISON DEPARTMENT
OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

MEMORANDUM FOR RECIPIENTS

This study examines in some depth the International Liaison Department (ILD) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the only one of the Party's central departments on which there is enough evidence to support such an examination. The study finds that the ILD, radically reorganized in recent years, has been given new duties -- particularly in the realm of improving the CCP's relations with governing CP's abroad -- and with these new duties an enhanced status. The ILD is no longer obliged to implement the revolutionary, counter-productive policy of trying to export the Cultural Revolution, but instead is now charged with fostering reconciliation with friendly governing CP's, and a more relaxed line toward the CP's in non-Communist countries. Among these latter, the ILD is reducing its commitments and diversifying its holdings.

This study was prepared by [redacted] a summer [redacted] intern with this Staff. [redacted] was given much help and valued counsel by other components of the Agency, in particular the Office of Current Intelligence [redacted]

25X1
25X1
25X1

Hal Ford
Chief, DD/I Special Research Staff

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

THE INTERNATIONAL LIAISON DEPARTMENT
OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

Contents

	<u>Page</u>
Summary	i
FUNCTIONS, ORGANIZATION AND STATUS	1
THE ILD IN ACTION -- IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY. . .	13
Relations with Communist Government/Parties. . .	13
Relations with Opposition and Splinter Communist Parties	23
PERSONNEL.	43
Director:	
Keng Piao	43
Deputy Directors (Conjectural)	
Jen Yun-chung	47
Shen Chien.	48
Yang Yu-heng.	51
Chang Tsang	52
Chang Hsiang-shan	53
Other Known Members	
Tang Ming-chao.	57
Mao Pao-chung	58
Chao Hsueh-li	59
Tien Shu-chien.	59
Yang Chun-cheng	59
Hsiao Huang	60
Yao Shih-ken.	60

SECRET

25X1

	<u>Page</u>
Other Possible ILD Members	
Tsao I-ou61
Feng Hsuan.62
Chu Ta-cheng.63
Liu Ke-ming64
Liu Chun-fa64
Ma Te-chuan65
Hsing Chu-fang.65
Huang Chun.65
Lin Hsien-nung.66
Hung Tso-chun66
Chang Chen-hai.66
Other Persons Seen Often in Company of ILD	
Personalities at ILD Functions	
Cheng Kuo-tsai.67
Chin Hui.67
Lao Yuan-hui.67
Li Mei.68
Li Kuei-cheng68
Li Ming-hsiang.68
Li Wen-kun.68
Shih Yung-lu.68
Tai Sheng-pu.68
High-Level Party Personnel Often Associated with ILD	
Kang Sheng.69
Kuo Yu-feng71
Yao Wen-yuan.72
Chang Chun-chiao.73
Wu Fa-hsien73
Chi Teng-kuei74
Chang Shih-chung.74
Liu Hsi-chang75
ANNEX.	A-1

SECRET

25X1

**THE INTERNATIONAL LIAISON DEPARTMENT
OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY**

Summary

The International Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party was probably formed in the early 1950s, possibly after a reallocation of the responsibilities of the United Front Department. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, it remained behind the scenes, responsible for contacts, communications, and coordination with other Communist Parties around the world. It began to be more active with the development of the Sino-Soviet split, when its delegates to foreign Party meetings began to be more vociferous in advancing the CCP cause. As the rift deepened and the Chinese began searching out independent supporters of their position, the ILD's activities became more important.

Organized geographically and working hand-in-hand with Chinese embassies in various countries, the ILD performed the task of finding, investigating and eventually supporting pro-Chinese splinter groups and malcontents, encouraging them to form so-called "Marxist-Leninist" parties in opposition to pro-Soviet "revisionist" parties. In this task the ILD pursued a patient, soft-sell policy, providing funds to keep the promising groups active, and offering political and organizational training on Chinese soil where it

- i -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

was deemed profitable. The ILD appeared to receive high-level supervision from the two ranking members of the Party Secretariat, Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen, and on occasion from Liu Shao-chi, then Mao's designated successor.

The purges of the Cultural Revolution had a tremendous impact on the ILD, both organizationally and operationally. Its top-level leaders and supervisors were wiped out very early in the Revolution, and those who replaced them, under the guidance of Kang Sheng and a group of PLA officers, were obliged to implement a counter-productive policy of ideological militancy and organizational interference until this "revolutionary diplomacy" was replaced by a new, more flexible line. In 1968 and much of 1969, the ILD remained ideologically and organizationally incoherent, gradually retreating from the policy of giving explicit directions to splinter parties, and trying instead to improve strained relations with ruling Parties in selected countries. Although the department's leadership seemed to be generally in the hands of the PLA, under the overall direction of the civilian Kang Sheng and his wife, one veteran ILD cadre, Shen Chien, continued to make frequent appearances.

It was not until late 1970 that the new ILD really began to take shape, with the reappearance of several veteran members who had been missing during the Cultural Revolution. Shen Chien had been identified by Kang Sheng as head of the department in mid-1970, but Kang's own disappearance shortly thereafter left a leadership vacuum. This was filled by Keng Piao, Peking's Ambassador to Albania, who

-ii-

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

returned in January 1971 and was named to head the ILD in March. During this period, the military presence which had dominated the ILD was reduced. PLA officer Kuo Yu-feng ceased to appear with ILD personnel and reportedly took up full-time duties with the Organization Department. Another PLA figure, Chu Ta-cheng, disappeared. Yang Yu-heng, yet another PLA man once high in the ILD hierarchy, went out of sight for a time, and has more recently been making low-level ILD appearances. Jen Yun-chung remains the principal visible PLA member of importance within the department. In this regard, the ILD has been an exception to the general course of Party-rebuilding, which has seen PLA domination of most provincial Party committees, of many if not most of the central Party departments, and of the Party committee of the Foreign Ministry.

In addition to consolidating Party control over the ILD, Keng Piao has been expanding the department. Several new members have been added to the small coterie of veteran cadres (who seem to occupy the top leadership positions) listed in the open press as members of the ILD. Division of labor along functional and geographic lines, though not specified in the press, seems to be taking place.

The ILD itself seems to have acquired more importance along with its greater visibility. In any kind of public listing of central regime departments, it is ordinarily the first one mentioned, and its leaders are usually the first ones mentioned in group appearance lists. On such occasions, Keng Piao is invariably the first or second person mentioned after Politburo members, and ILD deputy directors Shen Chien and Jen Yun-chung invariably

-iii-

SECRET

25X1

appear before vice-foreign ministers and sometimes before even the acting foreign minister, Chi Peng-fei.

In terms of duties performed, the ILD has recently become more active in the implementation of policy toward China's major allies, particularly in the realm of improving government/Party relations. Some observers believe that the ILD, and particularly Keng Piao, plays an active role in the overall formulation of foreign policy, and has supervisory authority over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and all other departments concerned with foreign relations. However, it seems likely that -- as the Chinese themselves have said privately -- the most important foreign policies are formulated by a small group around Chou En-lai (of which Keng is apparently one member).

With the onset of the Cultural Revolution, ILD policy incoherence seemed to parallel the condition of China itself. The export of radical excesses to foreign countries caused China's Party relations to decline along with its overall international prestige. Ideological militancy, as well as obeisance to the thought of Chairman Mao, was demanded of China's Party allies, large or small. Those who had the independence and will to do so, resisted this type of activity. The result was that China's only allies were the Albanians, who had already burned all other bridges, and a smattering of insignificant "Marxist-Leninist" splinter groups. Upon these latter, the ILD made further demands, such as the creation of clandestine

-iv-

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

organizations, which added up to requiring a duplication of the Chinese experience. These demands often caused serious internal difficulties for the parties concerned.

With the decline in "revolutionary diplomacy" after mid-1967 and the perceived military threat from the Soviet Union after autumn 1968, ILD policy began to reflect the change in the thinking of the CCP leadership. In late 1969, the ILD, although still in a state of organizational disorder, began to implement a policy of reconciliation with the CCP's various potential allies. This included a gradual warming of Party relations with North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, North Korea, the Laotian Patriotic Front, and Rumania. As the ILD has itself consolidated, it has continued to play a major role in maintaining these good relations.

With a new, less militant ideology in hand, the ILD has put into effect a more relaxed policy towards smaller Party friends, much to the relief of some of them. Organizational as well as ideological requirements have become much more flexible and realistic, and the Chinese have admitted that earlier policies were sometimes wrong. On the other hand, it appears that some loyal Party allies which offer insignificant help to the Chinese have been downgraded in order to pursue bigger game at the government level. Stressing Maoist principles of "self-decision and self-sufficiency," the ILD has basically terminated financial support for some "Marxist-Leninist" (pro-Chinese) parties, leaving them to flounder. Consonant with this, Peking has sometimes shown as

- v -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

much (or as little) interest in other pro-Chinese groups as in the proven, loyal "Marxist-Leninist" parties.

There are further indications that, even while continuing to support Communist-led armed struggle in Asia, the furthering of diplomatic relations may have some effect on the type of Chinese support given to such rebel groups outside Indochina. Though it is unlikely that the CCP will terminate support to rebel movements in Malaysia and Burma, it is not as yet clear how it will handle the problem of maintaining good relations with both sides in a civil war. The final policy stance will probably be more the result of considerations of Chinese national interest than of ideological consistency.

-vi-

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

THE INTERNATIONAL LIAISON DEPARTMENT
OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

Functions, Organization and Status

One organizational feature that appears to be common to nearly all Communist Parties of any size is a department of the Party set up to deal with relations with other Communist Parties and countries. In the Soviet Union, this function is divided between an International Department (for non-bloc parties) and a Bloc Department (for Communist Parties in power). In the People's Republic of China, these functions are united in an International Liaison Department (ILD). It is the purpose of the first part of this paper to trace the organizational development of the ILD* from a relatively obscure and clandestine branch of the Party to its present status as an open, active participant in the implementation of Chinese foreign policy.

Prior to 1971, the existence of the ILD was not officially acknowledged

It may have been

25X1

*The translation International Liaison Department is technically incorrect: The official name given to the department by the 9th Central Committee is Chung Yang Tui Wai Lien Lo Pu, which more accurately translates as "Central Foreign Liaison Department." However, NCNA and FBIS translate the term as International Liaison Department, so this paper will do the same. It is important to (continued on page 2)

-1-

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

[REDACTED]

formed in or about 1951-52 when the United Front Department was split in two, though this is uncertain.

Prior to and during the Cultural Revolution, the functions of the ILD were limited.

[REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED] Its primary responsibility was to maintain contacts with friendly Communist Parties in Communist-ruled countries, and to find, nurture and develop pro-Chinese sentiment wherever it was found. In this capacity, it often worked hand-in-glove with overseas MFA personnel in the embassies.

At the same time, it is clear from the available evidence that the MFA and ILD kept their functions carefully separated.

[REDACTED]

25X1

(continued from page 1) note, however, that this is a new name; prior to the 9th Central Committee meeting, the official name for the department was Chung Yang Kuo Chi Lien Lo Pu, which does translate accurately as "Central International Liaison Department."

- 2 -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

The first head of the liaison department was Wang Chia-hsiang. This was surmised from his frequent attendance at foreign Party Congresses and his greeting of Party delegations to Peking, and has more recently been confirmed by [redacted] Red Guard posters. Wang got into trouble in the Peng Te-huai affair of 1959, and, although his fall was not formally ratified at that time, and he remained nominally the department head, he did go into eclipse; de facto leadership of the ILD passed into the hands of Wu Hsiu-chuan, with Politburo-level supervision apparently provided by Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen.

25X1

25X1

The purges of the Cultural Revolution hit the ILD very early. Among the first to be disposed of was Wang Chia-hsiang, and by early 1966, Wu Hsiu-chuan and much of the rest of the top leadership were also out of power, if perhaps not yet purged.* Leadership

*See Appendix for list of suspected ILD members purged during the Cultural Revolution.

- 3 -

SECRET

25X1

25X1

[redacted]

duties were taken over in March 1966 (according to later Red Guard posters) by Liu Ning-i, former head of the ACFTU, assisted by Chao I-min, a veteran ILD member with much experience. These two carried on the majority of the visible work of the ILD during 1966 and early 1967, with Liu himself attending a New Zealand party congress in April 1966. As the Cultural Revolution expanded and grew more violent and disruptive, the ILD, like nearly all other components of the Chinese bureaucracy, ceased to function effectively. Following the standard pattern, younger members of the department engaged in vicious criticism of the higher cadres, and the department became almost completely paralyzed. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] fierce ideological quarrelling had broken out between "heaven" and "earth" factions within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the ILD, with the result that work came to a virtual standstill. Nobody was willing to take the responsibility for writing reports or signing papers, and almost all work was passed on to the highest levels of leadership, which were also under heavy ideological fire. Sometime during this period, Wang Li, former radical journalist and member of the central Cultural Revolution Group, was brought into the ILD as a deputy director in charge of combatting "revisionism" within the department. Much of the middle-level leadership was apparently brought down during this early 1967 period. In late 1967, things went from bad to worse. In September, Wang Li himself came under intense criticism from his superiors, who curtailed his duties and informed the ILD to do likewise; he was later purged. Chao I-min, although he claimed to be a member of the "revolutionary" faction of the department, was reportedly investigated on the basis of early

25X1

- 4 -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

1967 Red Guard evidence, and was declared a "renegade" in September 1967 and imprisoned. His fate is unknown, but he was dropped from the CCP Central Committee in 1969 and was presumably purged. Liu Ning-i also came under heavy attack. He was apparently defended by Kang Sheng for a time, but the attacks continued and Liu disappeared in early 1968.

In May 1968, a Canton Red Flag supplement carried a speech made by Kang Sheng to the "Military Control Group" of what was clearly the ILD, indicating that as far as internal organization was concerned, things were entirely in the hands of the PLA. External functions of the ILD, such as greeting foreign Party delegations, holding talks with them, and such other publicly reported activities, were handled by Kang Sheng and his wife, Tsao I-ou. The PLA figure Kuo Yu-feng was also brought up to Peking and elevated by Kang Sheng during this period.

Little information exists on what happened to the ILD during the rest of 1968 and much of 1969.

25X1

Apparently the ILD was still in a state of limbo, in spite of its new name and its official status under the 9th Central

- 5 -

SECRET

25X1

Committee. Public appearances were handled mainly by Kang Sheng and his wife, along with Kuo. In late 1969, the triumvirate of Shen Chien, Yang Yu-heng and Chu Ta-cheng, which was to remain in evidence all through 1970, began to appear. Shen was a veteran cadre, Yang a known PLA officer, and Chu believed to be a PLA officer. During late 1970, other veteran ILD members, such as old Party cadres Chang Hsiang-shan and Tang Ming-chao, began to make reappearances.

With the disappearance of Kang Sheng in November 1970 and the recall of Ambassador Keng Piao from Albania in December, the ILD apparently began to move toward stability. Chu Ta-cheng and Kuo Yu-feng made their last appearances in ILD roles in January 1971 (Chu reappeared in November), and Yang Yu-heng seemingly went into decline. Keng Piao began to make ILD appearances in February, and was identified as head of that department in March 1971. Since then, several other members of the department have been publicly identified, indicating a new public status and prestige for a formerly unpublicized organization. In addition, the staff of the ILD seems to be expanding considerably, with several new faces appearing since May 1971. Keng's rising status may eventually lead to a Politburo or revamped Secretariat position, though this is pure conjecture.

There is now a striking scarcity of PLA men within the ILD. Almost all of its apparent leaders and supervisors come from civilian backgrounds. Until he was recently purged, Politburo member and head of the PLA Air Force Wu Fa-hsien showed up

SECRET

25X1

occasionally at small ILD functions, but the Politburo members most frequently seen in connection with the ILD in 1971 have all been civilians: Chou En-lai, Yao Wen-yuan, Chang Chun-chiao, and Chi Teng-kuei. As for actual department membership, Jen Yun-chung (possibly the senior deputy to Keng Piao) and Yang Yu-heng are the only known PLA figures seen often in ILD roles; Kuo Yu-feng has been transferred out of the ILD, Yang Yu-heng seems to have declined in influence, and Chu Ta-cheng's current post is uncertain. This has contrasted markedly with increasing PLA participation in other sections of the Chinese Party and government.

Before the Cultural Revolution, the ILD was [redacted] between 1000 and 1100 members, many of them engaged in research activities. After the Cultural Revolution, Kang Sheng reportedly put the number remaining at 200-300 [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted] Recent indications are that the department, under Keng Piao, is again rebuilding its numbers.

25X1

Formerly, the ILD was organized hierarchically and geographically, and to a degree, functionally, with the majority of the work being done in the geographic bureaus, of which there were nine [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] These bureaus were:

25X1

- 1st -- Soviet Union & East Europe
- 2nd -- Korea & Vietnam
- 3rd -- India, Ceylon, Pakistan, Nepal,
Indonesia, Malaya
- 4th -- Japan, Burma, Cambodia, Thailand,
Laos

- 7 -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

- 5th -- US, Canada
- 6th -- Australia, New Zealand
- 7th -- West Europe
- 8th -- Africa
- 9th -- Latin America
- 10th -- Reception
- 11th* -- (Data ?)

There was also a separate general (administrative) office.

The leadership was conventionally hierarchical: a director of the department, several deputy directors, a secretary general and several deputy secretaries-general, all above the bureau chiefs.

It is presumed that this organizational structure was entirely destroyed during the Cultural Revolution. Other events, such as the heightened importance of the Vietnam conflict, and increasing hostility with the Soviet Union, have probably also brought about changes in the organization.

25X1

the chart below is entirely conjectural, based upon appearances in public with various delegations. It seems likely that, for functional and liaison reasons, the organization is somewhat similar to that of the MFA.

25X1

- 8 -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

DEPARTMENTAL LEADERSHIP**Politburo Supervision**

YAO Wen-yuan
 CHANG Chun-chiao
 CHI Teng-kuei

Department Director

KENG Piao

Deputy Directors (?)

JEN Yun-chung (senior?)
 SHEN Chien
 YANG Yu-heng (?)
 CHANG Tsang (?)
 CHANG Hsiang-shan

BUREAU LEADERSHIP**Soviet Union and East Europe Section**

LIU Ke-ming	-- section head
FENG Hsuan	-- section leader, with a political security background

Western Europe, North America and Australia Section

TANG Ming-chao	-- section head (until assigned to UN)
CHAO Hsueh-li	-- 'leading member' perhaps Western Europe subsection
LAO Yuan-hui	-- interpreter, English
TAI Sheng-pu	-- interpreter, English
LI Mei	-- interpreter, English

- 9 -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

Bureau Leadership (continued)**Latin American Section**

SHEN Chien -- section head (?)

Asian Section

SHEN Chien	-- section head (?)
CHANG Hsiang-shan	-- head of Korea/Japan sub-section
TIEN Shu-chien	
YANG Chun-cheng	-- interpreter, Korean
CHIN Hui	-- interpreter, Korean
MAO Pao-chung	-- head of Indochina sub-section (?)
HSIAO Huang	
HUANG Chun	-- interpreter, Vietnamese
HUNG Tso-chun	-- interpreter, Vietnamese
CHENG Kuo-tsai	-- interpreter, Laotian
LI Kuei-cheng	
LI Ming-hsiang	
LI Wen-kun	
SHIH Yung-lu	

West Asia and African Section

CHANG Tsang (?)

Reception Section

LIU Chun-fa
 HSING Chu-fang
 MA Te-chuan
 LIN Hsien-nung
 YAO Shih-ken
 CHANG Chen-hai

-10-

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

There is some disagreement as to present and past responsibilities of the ILD. Basic policies are of course formulated in the Politburo standing committee. Below that level, it is possible to argue -- as some observers have -- that the ILD as a Party organ is responsible for the next level of formulation of foreign policy, superior in power to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is subordinate to the State Council. In other words, it is conceivable that the ILD is the focal point of supervision of the entire foreign affairs apparatus, including the MFA, the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, and other departments.*

There is some information to support this view. First, Keng's own Party position is apparently quite high; he has been listed on many occasions as the first Party dignitary after Politburo members (although he has begun to follow Kuo Mo-jo), and always ahead of Chi Peng-fei, acting Foreign Minister of the PRC. Further, Keng was mentioned by name (along with Chou En-lai) in a recent Mao directive on foreign policy; no other Party members were mentioned. Further, in contrast to previous custom, ILD personnel are now given pride of place in the Chinese media. Not only

*There is some speculation that Keng is a member of a possible de facto secretariat under Chou En-lai, responsible for the day-to-day running of China's affairs.

-11-

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

is the department always listed ahead of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but ILD deputy directors now are consistently mentioned ahead of deputy foreign ministers, and on occasion ahead of the acting foreign minister. Further, members of the ILD have recently been appearing regularly at functions which they previously would not have attended, for example, greeting economic or government study delegations from allied countries, attending various protocol functions and receptions at foreign embassies (from socialist countries) and other affairs usually handled exclusively by the MFA. Further, Keng Piao has been giving numerous briefings to foreign Communists, at which he has spoken with authority on international affairs and Chinese relations with non-Communist nations, as well as on international Communist relations. For example, shortly after meeting with Keng and other ILD personnel, in July 1971 a sympathetic American, William Hinton, wrote an apparently authoritative article for a Chinese newspaper concerning the rationale for China's recent initiatives toward the United States, defending those actions against anticipated leftist criticism.

However, most of the ILD's public appearances have been with friendly Communist delegations, and that aspect of foreign policy is clearly its main concern. It does not seem to have the scope to act as the focal point for the shaping of all foreign policy below the politburo standing committee level. On balance, it seems likely that MFA personnel have been telling the truth in insisting that important foreign-policy decisions are made by a small group around Chou En-lai. Keng Piao is probably one member of that group.

- 12 -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

The ILD in Action -- Implementation of Policy

Any discussion of policy pursued by the ILD is based upon scant information and bound to be speculative. Moreover, there would necessarily be a time lapse between the actual formulation of policy by the standing committee of the Politburo and its correct implementation and reiteration by the liaison department -- which makes for further imprecision. For the purposes of clarity and convenience, the discussion of policy herein is divided into two topics, that of relations between the CCP and other Communist state parties (e.g., CPSU, Korean Workers Party), and that of relations between the CCP and clandestine or opposition parties in countries not ruled by Communist governments. In terms of information available, most of the discussion of the former is based upon open source information

25X1

Relations with Communist Government/Parties: By 1963, the Sino-Soviet split and its world-wide repercussions in the Communist movement had significantly cut down the number and frequency of the CCP's party contacts and functions with other Bloc countries. Not that the ILD was out of work, but there was probably much less overt work for it to do in this field than in earlier periods of international Communist amicability.

With the onset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, China's Party relations decreased even more. Like most capitalist and neutral nations, China's few Communist

- 13 -

SECRET

25X1

'allies' generally reacted very coldly to Maoist "Red Guard diplomacy," with the result that both Party and state relations with other socialist countries declined steadily. If -- as seems likely -- the appearance of ILD personnel at various public functions is an indication of the state of relations between the CCP and other Parties, the only Bloc Party which remained on good terms with the CCP by early 1967 was the Communist Party of Albania. Relations with the North Korean Workers Party (KWP) and the Vietnamese Workers Party (VWP) or Lao Dong Party were outwardly correct, but strained. While delegations from the DRV still visited Peking on occasion, receptions were not attended by Kang Sheng, Liu Ning-i or Chao I-min, the known ILD leaders during this period. The KWP was treated even more coolly by the CCP in the press, on important anniversaries, and on those few occasions when delegations from the DPRK came to Peking during the Cultural Revolution. By February 1967, the strains in relations with the KWP were particularly severe, as a result of Chinese dissemination of Red Guard attacks on Pyongyang. Relations with the CPSU and with the strongly pro-Soviet Parties of East Europe and the Mongolian People's Republic 'were totally ruptured, and reflected open hostility. In contrast, Albania basked in the warmth of grand Party receptions, often attended by the entire CCP Politburo, numerous celebrations and receptions at embassies, and lengthy press coverage. Enver Hoxha, Albania's Party and government leader, became the foreign leader best known in China. The CCP maintained relations with the Rumanian Party, but they were only moderately better than with other East European Communists.

- 14 -

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

Mao ordered a pullback from "revolutionary diplomacy" in August 1967, but it was only gradually that this policy began to be reflected in improved relations with various Communist regimes. In the wake of the Sino-Soviet border clashes of March 1969, and in line with new ideological and policy formulations adopted by the new 9th Central Committee in April, improvement was marked. Judging by press coverage, length and wording of Party communications, and frequency and attendance at receptions, Chinese relations with Albania were still the most amicable, but relations were clearly better with the DRV and the NLFSV. The ILD, represented by Kang Sheng and a few others, played an increasing role in these public demonstrations of improved relations. In June 1969, China dispatched to the DRV one of the first post-Cultural Revolution ambassadors, and also gave embassy status to the NLFSV, which now became the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRGSV). In the summer of 1969, Chinese overtures for improvement of Party relations with the Communist Parties of Rumania and North Korea also became evident. The CCP's posture toward Cuba's party, however, appeared to remain cool and distant. The Soviet Union continued, of course, to be an object of scorn, while its East European allies were only slightly less disparaged. The few delegations from these latter countries that did visit Peking received quiet, unheralded receptions, strictly in accordance with formal protocol, and attended only by a few government and military personnel.

October 1969 was a very active fence-mending month for the Chinese Communists, in which the ILD, even in its tenuous state of organization, appeared to be an active participant. Two future leaders of the emerging

-15-

SECRET

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]

department, Shen Chien and Yang Yu-heng, attended the 2 October soiree given by the Politburo for high-level Party/government delegations from the DRV, the PRGSV, Albania, DPRK and Rumania, which were attending National Day celebrations in Peking. In December 1969, the ILD was also represented at a reception given by the central Cultural Revolution Group -- just prior to the CRG's disappearance -- for friendly Communist and "Marxist-Leninist" parties from Albania, France, DRV, Burma and Australia.

During the early part of 1970, Communist China, with the ILD still playing an active if minor role, continued to improve Party relations with its chosen allies. In April 1970, Sino-Korean relations took a great step forward with the visit of Premier Chou En-lai to Pyongyang. Thereafter, the DPRK received much more Chinese press coverage, expanded the 'social' activities of its embassy in Peking, and generally began to receive more high-level treatment by the CCP, including more frequent appearances at Sino-Korean functions by ILD members. VWP First Secretary Le Duan's May 1970 visit to Peking and Mao Tse-tung's 20 May statement of support for the Vietnamese cause appeared to reach a new high point of Sino-Vietnamese amicability. The warm, high-level reception given to Rumanian Communist Party leader Emil Bodnaras on his June 1970 visit to China also gave evidence of improved relations. Kang Sheng

[REDACTED] began to make more frequent appearances with various delegations from these countries, and even made an occasional public speech.

It is, however, unwarranted to conclude -- on the basis of more frequent, friendly high-level gatherings between the CCP and other Communist Parties -- that these Parties have become close in all respects. In spite of

-16-

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

protestations of everlasting "militant and revolutionary friendship" or similar sentiments, there is evidence of serious mutual suspicions between the Chinese and various friendly parties. Only the fanatically anti-Soviet Albanians seem to be fully trusted.

25X1

there were strong elements of "revisionism" within the VWP, which even Ho Chi Minh, though a good revolutionary, could not cope with or understand.* Kim Il-sung's vacillating flirtations with the CPSU and the JCP must also make his ideological purity suspect in Chinese eyes, and indeed, Keng Piao, as late as June 1971, has expressed CCP reservations about the internal workings of the KWP. The Rumanians, too, must appear as ideological fence-straddlers.

It would appear, then, that pragmatism began to take precedence over ideology during the post-Cultural Revolution period, and particularly since the Soviet

*This type of briefing is an example of the tenacity of the kind of attitude which had proven so counterproductive to Chinese foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution, and from which the CCP was apparently able to pull back only gradually. Today it would be branded as "ultra-Leftist." Chang Tsang, though identified here as an ILD official, has never made a public appearance. If, as seems possible, he is no longer part of the department, expressions of this type of opinion may explain this.

-17-

SECRET

25X1

invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and the bloody Sino-Soviet clashes of early 1969. China needed allies, if only to exert opinion pressure on the Soviets to dissuade them from what the Chinese may have considered as impending military action. In view of this need for political support, ideological differences began to be downplayed. The ILD leadership, consisting mainly of civilian cadres, veterans of the old ILD or the diplomatic corps, would seem to be particularly well-suited to the performance of this type of task.

After the decline of Kang Sheng, the ILD became even more active in its relations with established governing Communist Parties. However, it still seemed to take a back seat to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) on public occasions, perhaps mainly due to the fact that its leading members at that time, Shen Chien and Jen Yun-chung, lacked the Party or government status to properly display the growing importance of the department. This lack was eliminated with the return to Peking of Keng Piao, who had been serving as ambassador to Albania. Keng returned in January 1971, appeared at various foreign affairs functions the next month, and was finally publicly identified as head of the ILD in early March, when he accompanied Chou En-lai on an important trip to Hanoi. Since that time, the ILD has been significantly more active in the maintenance of good Party/government relations with selected Communist nations.

Asia has appeared to be the area of primary concern in this regard, and the ILD has apparently played a major role in continuing the warming trend of relations with North Korea, North Vietnam and other Asian Communist Parties (with the notable exception of

SECRET

25X1

the JCP). Le Duan, the First Secretary of the VWP, visited China enroute to, and immediately upon his return from the 24th Congress of the CPSU in May 1971. Keng Piao was a regular participant in the talks that ensued, and accompanied Le Duan on his tour of China. Keng and other members of the ILD, Shen Chien in particular, have been conspicuous participants in a variety of functions and receptions for DRV delegations, at which, previously, ILD members were not present. These have included the greeting of government, economic, and youth delegations to Peking, as well as attendance at numerous receptions in the DRV embassy.

In the spring and summer of 1971, the ILD has become increasingly active in developing and maintaining relations with the two other Southeast Asian Communist Parties in control of a large part of their countries: The Laotian Patriotic Front (LPF) or Neo Lao Hak Xat, and the Cambodian People's Revolutionary Party. The CCP has generally expressed firm support for the activities of these embattled Parties, and recently their visiting delegations have received public, high-level treatment in Peking. LPF leader Kaysone Phomivane visited Peking in April 1971, and was received by high-ranking officials of the CCP, including Keng Piao and other members of the ILD. Keng recently commented also on the fact that the Chinese were highly impressed by the military success and mass appeal demonstrated by the Cambodian Communists since the 1970 anti-Sihanouk coup, and, perhaps as evidence of that growing interest, appeared prominently at an August 1971 reception for a Cambodian rebel hero, the first time that any ILD personnel had had any public association with Cambodian delegations.

-19-

SECRET

25X1

Keng Piao and Shen Chien were particularly active, during the summer of 1971, in improving Chinese relations with North Korea. Keng was a member of the delegation, headed by Politburo member and Vice-Premier Li Hsien-nien, which visited Pyongyang in July to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the Sino-Korean treaty of friendship and mutual assistance, and was one of the main Party members consistently present at the departure and return of various student, journalist and worker delegations to the DPRK. Other ILD members were frequent participants in Sino-Korean functions, and it would appear that earlier criticisms of Kim Il-sung's Korean Workers Party were laid aside.

Outside of Asia, the Chinese have seemed particularly concerned with maintaining good Party relations with Rumania. The June 1971 visit of Rumania's government and Party leader Nicolae Ceausescu was the culmination of a warming trend that had brought ever more important Rumanian leaders to China since early 1970. The August 1970 stopover in Bucharest of a high-level PLA delegation and the extension of a large loan provide indications of China's interest in consolidating this relatively recent friendship. The ILD has seemingly been quite instrumental in pursuing this policy. Keng Piao, for example, was one of Ceausescu's escorts on his recent tour of China. Again, ideological issues have been consistently played down, the main virtue of the Rumanian Party being its independence of and resistance to its Soviet neighbor. Although the Chinese appraisal of the Rumanian ideological position is mixed, Rumania's anti-Soviet tendency has provided sufficient assurance for the Chinese to develop Party relations.

- 20 -

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

[REDACTED]

There has been considerable speculation that China is developing relations with Rumania and Yugoslavia with the intent of consolidating an anti-Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe consisting of these two new friends and Albania.

[REDACTED]

25X1

Thus far, however, the ILD has done nothing to restore relations with the Yugoslav Party. Presumably, the ideological gap is still too wide for the Chinese to pretend that Party relations can be maintained with a Party which they had so recently denied even the name of "socialist." However, in contrast to 1970, the Chinese in 1971 have not published any messages from renegade Yugoslav "Marxist-Leninist" party groups, reinforcing other evidence that the Chinese are at least letting ideological disagreements with the once "arch-revisionist" Tito government cool for the sake of improved state relations.

Albania's special relationship with China, including the closest of Party relations, has frequently been exploited by the Chinese. Tirana has cooperated closely with Peking's policy of searching out and supporting ideological allies, particularly in Europe. Not only have Albanian embassies in various countries been involved in financial support for various pro-Chinese Marxist-Leninist parties disposed in Western Europe, but they have been entrusted by the Chinese,

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

[REDACTED]

through the ILD, with the task of political and ideological training of numerous pro-Chinese elements which find it either impossible or impolitic to go to China.

[REDACTED]

25X1

The task of consolidating and reassuring political, if not ideological, allies has become particularly important in the light of China's new tactics vis-a-vis the United States. These tactics have not been warmly received amongst China's Party allies; the only open endorsements have come from the Rumanians and North Koreans. The North Vietnamese, in spite of China's reassurances [REDACTED] have remained very cool to the idea in public [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED] Although the LPF has remained silent on the issue, the NLFSV has shown some confusion over the matter, and has ended up reaffirming its independence, asserting that it will never succumb to any other Party's leadership, including that of the CCP.

[REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED] This awareness has

-22-

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

manifested itself in repeated reassurances to the North Vietnamese and others that China will not sell out its principles, nor its allies. Here again the ILD has seemed to play an important role.

Relations with Opposition and Splinter Communist Parties: The more important of the ILD's tasks in the Cultural Revolution period and for a short time thereafter (as it had been ever since the emergence of Sino-Soviet rivalry) was the identification, instruction, and support of Communist Party groups favorable to Peking in foreign countries. This function, although certainly less important now than is the ILD's participation in the maintenance of state/Party relations with certain countries, is still actively carried out by the ILD today.

Chinese policy in this matter has gone through a number of changes, in response to developments in the real world and different official interpretations of Mao Tse-tung's "thought."

Prior to the Cultural Revolution, it was the responsibility of ILD personnel in some of the larger overseas missions (such as, presumably, the embassies in Paris and Bern), or, more often, the head of mission in the smaller embassies, to identify, contact, analyze, report on, and support pro-Chinese groups -- often small and insignificant.

25X1


- 23 -

SECRET



25X1

SECRET



25X1



25X1

Operationally, the ILD worked in close cooperation with the foreign intelligence organ of the Party, the Investigation Department (ID), a member of which,  has served as a Deputy Secretary General of the ILD. Use of ID information by the ILD was supplemented by a daily NCNA publication, "Reference Material." (Ts'an-k'ao tzu-liao), which was mainly a translation of foreign newspaper articles, and by another NCNA publication, "Brotherly Parties Publications Material" (Hsiung-ti Tang Pao-K'an Ts'ai-liao), which was a compendium of translated foreign Party publications. In addition, 

25X1

 the reports of NCNA 'stringers' (foreign nationals employed overseas by the NCNA) supplemented this information store. 

25X1

25X1


- 24 -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1



25X1

If the trip to China proved to be successful for the group concerned, in that the ILD found it to be "genuinely" Marxist-Leninist or at least worthy of further cultivation, instructions were passed on to the original point of contact -- either an embassy or NCNA office -- to continue and develop the contact.

There is some evidence that, before the Cultural Revolution, once one particular party or group had received official Chinese approval, contacts with other groups were generally not pursued. It was apparently the ILD's position that, once relations were established with one Party, direct relations with other revolutionary parties or groups would be counter-productive.

This policy and procedure led to reverses during the early stages of the Cultural Revolution. Among the "Marxist-Leninist" parties already cultivated, several seemed reluctant or unable to make the kind of ideological shifts that current Maoist precepts seemed to demand, and these attempted to curtail their relations with the CCP. Some which had

-25-

SECRET

25X1



25X1

gained official ILD support, such as the Jacques Grippa faction of the "Marxist-Leninist" Party of Belgium, openly declared their distaste for the Cultural Revolution and supported the policies which they attributed to Liu Shao-chi. This, of course, brought about their immediate fall from favor. Although the ILD had always been faced with the problem of discovering the "genuine" Marxist-Leninist parties among a host of competing pro-Chinese groups, the problem became particularly acute in 1966-67, when pro-Maoist groups seemed to proliferate. Additionally, in line with the tougher stance of "revolutionary" Maoist diplomacy, the ILD was responsible for making sure that parties which declared themselves to be pro-Chinese were indeed toeing the correct ideological line. These knotty problems, added to the fact that the ILD leadership was being heavily attacked during the Cultural Revolution, led to general incoherence in policy.

This confusion manifested itself in several ways. First of all, the ILD virtually stopped sending messages out to embassy officials, and provided no guidance whatever to field personnel attempting to select the "genuine" Marxist-Leninists from a host of Maoist groups. Further, it seems that, rather than working through their disintegrating ILD apparatus, Liu Ning-i, Chao I-min and (later) Kang Sheng began increasingly to encourage various party and faction leaders to come personally to China, where, they apparently felt, more thorough and reliable judgments could be made of the various Maoist supplicants.

For those who showed promise, or who had already received the blessing of official Chinese recognition for their particular groups, a trip to China could also

-26-

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

include extensive briefings and de-briefings and
a rigorous political training course.

25X1

- 27 -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1




25X1

The widespread purges and dislocations within the CCP caused by the Cultural Revolution, though they did not cause the discontinuance of foreign visits, did tend to give pause.



25X1



25X1

- 28 -

SECRET

25X1



SECRET

25X1

25X1

In contrast to the later period, when the ILD soft-pedaled ideological differences and used persuasion to try to win over visiting delegations to their point of view, the Cultural Revolution saw not only an increased demand by the ILD for Maoist orthodoxy and ideological militancy, but also an increase in organizational demands on foreign parties. The idea of creating a clandestine party organization parallel to the overt organization (where one existed) began to be proposed by the ILD. Whether this was done as part of a blind application of Mao's concept of Chinese revolutionary experience, or out of a real concern for the welfare and safety of Marxist-Leninist parties under possibly repressive governments, is uncertain. But it appears that the ILD began to stress this idea of parallel structures more heavily for a number of parties during the Cultural Revolution. In those parties, such as some in Latin America, where governmental suppression was a real problem, such a policy was natural and acceptable. However, for those parties which were allowed to operate openly and competed with other parties for popular support, the idea was irrelevant and impertinent. In New Zealand, when CPNZ Party Secretary V. G. Wilcox attempted to put the parallel

- 29 -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

[REDACTED]

structures into effect, he found himself faced first with difficulties in convincing old cadres of the necessity of going underground -- with connotations of armed struggle -- and then with open party rebellion from one of the largest local CPNZ committees. The end result of this was a split in the party, which, to the Chinese, was very undesirable. After his 1968 visit to China, during which Wilcox was apparently criticized for "his" mishandling of the plan, the Chinese dropped the idea

25X1

[REDACTED] By 1970, the ILD had abandoned this idea altogether and had added it to the growing list of Liu Shao-chi's errors.

25X1

[REDACTED]

During the late stages of the Cultural Revolution, Peking began to get a good deal of negative feedback from its party proteges concerning the guidance and advice from Peking. From New Zealand and Australia came grumblings about the type of propaganda coming from Peking.

25X1

[REDACTED]

Apparently even China's most loyal allies concluded that the Cultural Revolution materials -- such as stress on "armed struggle" and Mao's ego-cult -- were

- 30 -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

•
•
unsuitable propaganda for foreign consumption.

25X1

•
•
- 31 -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

25X1

Another aspect of ILD policy, held over from earlier leadership, also began to receive heavy criticism from the CCP's more outspoken allies in Latin America. This concerned China's attitude toward factionalism and the official 'blessing' of certain parties by the CCP. Although ILD policy was very vague during the Cultural Revolution, it appeared that it followed the pre-Cultural Revolution penchant of selecting one party or group from among a number of competing radical organizations, and declaring it, on the basis of their general criteria or sometimes on the basis of Mao's personal recognition of the leader,* the orthodox "Marxist-Leninist" party within a certain country. This party, then, became the sole recipient of aid and encouragement, and often would have its articles published in the Chinese press.

Until recently, the ILD consistently carried out a policy of discouraging factionalism within these chosen parties, or among groups whose ideologies were very similar. Although personal quarrels and factionalizing have seemed to be endemic problems among radical groups that seek Chinese support, the ILD until 1970 strongly opposed these tendencies, often withholding financial and propaganda aid, or threatening to do so, until various factions within a certain

*This would seem to be the case with the "Marxist-Leninist" parties in Chile, Italy, and to some extent, New Zealand.

- 32 -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

party or competing groups of similar ideologies could unite and settle their difficulties. Such a policy was pursued with reference to pro-Chinese parties in Italy, Belgium, Sudan, Indonesia, and Latin America. Only when factionalism involved important ideological differences would the Chinese condone it.

By 1970, however, ILD policy on the issue of factionalism seemed to have changed. This was perhaps due to a combination of factors:

1. no amount of ILD pressure seemed to be able to quell the problem of factions within small splinter parties;

2. the ILD had come under no small amount of criticism from a number of sources for choosing one faction over another (particularly in Latin America), sometimes on the basis of false or unreliable information; and

3. there had been a change in the overall foreign policy line, shifting away from "revolutionary diplomacy."

The latter consideration is, of course, by far the most important. Although an exact date for this shift in emphasis of Chinese foreign policy is impossible to fix exactly, its results can perhaps be seen in the enunciation and implementation of ILD policy during late 1969 and 1970.

In contrast to the hard-line militancy and relatively stringent organizational "suggestions" made by the ILD during the Cultural Revolution period, the new line seems more pragmatic, relaxed and realistic.

-33-

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

As explained to various Party visitors to China in mid-1970 by Kang Sheng, Tang Ming-chao, and Chang Hsiang-shan, the latest ILD program contains strong elements of pragmatism. The new Maoist ideological demarche stresses independence and initiative, and strict attention to local conditions before determining party policy or organizational procedures.

25X1

Kang continued to stress the necessity for ideological correctness (apparently still in the context of Maoist orthodoxy), but the advice on careful study of local conditions (rather than the Chinese experience) for the application of correct organizational principles seems to be something of a return to pre-Cultural Revolution attitudes. The ILD has gone yet another step in retreating from attempts to exert organizational influence on foreign parties: it has decided to keep the financial aid given to any party to a minimum, and instead give moral and propaganda support to a wider range of pro-Chinese groups.

25X1

- 34 -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

25X1

This new policy was reflected in the press, particularly with the publication of National Day greetings and earlier congratulations. Most notable was the proliferation of these greetings in 1970, there being messages from three Italian "Marxist-Leninist" groups plus the PCI, two from the Netherlands, two from Belgium, and two from Greece.* Though

*Greetings were also printed from two "Marxist-Leninist" splinters in Yugoslavia and one in East Germany. These, however, may be fabrications or simply from one or two disaffected expatriates.

- 35 -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

the beginnings of this policy could be seen to a degree in 1969 National Day greetings, the tendency was much more pronounced in 1970.

In 1970, the rather sensitive issue of party finances also seems to have been cleared up some by the ILD. Tang explained in September that although giving political, military and financial aid to foreign parties could sometimes be a good thing, too often it had brought bad results such as misuse of funds, or a reliance upon the CCP for aid, leading to a lack of attention to local work.* It was admitted that the ILD's policy in this regard had been incorrect in the past, allegedly a result of Liu Shao-chi's faulty line, and that it had come under heavy criticism in the Cultural Revolution.

25X1

*The new policy was no doubt a reflection of Chinese disapproval of notorious fiscal irresponsibility and extravagance on the part of several splinter group leaders.

- 36 -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1




25X1



This period seemed to be rather a watershed for the ILD in terms of formulating and applying a cohesive policy. ILD officials in various briefings were now able to give clear and concise information to visiting parties with reference to ILD policy on various issues. The confusion and reticence of the Cultural Revolution period now in the past, and a new and more congenial Maoist orthodoxy in foreign relations apparently well in hand, ILD members began to expound and elaborate on CCP policies with some confidence. In addition to comments on Party organization, finances, the applicability of the Chinese experience, and encouragement of various competing Marxist-Leninist groups, the ILD unveiled new policies on other issues.

25X1



- 37 -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

Among these were the advocacy of close attention and support for student groups, the stated intention to work with independent sectors of pro-Soviet ("revisionist") parties (rather than to vilify them en masse), and stated opposition to any kind of international or large regional grouping of Marxist-Leninist parties, an idea which various Latin American parties had been voicing for some time.*

The ILD under Keng Piao seems to be carrying on these principles in relation to pro-Chinese parties, and perhaps it is even broadening them. Chinese non-interference in internal factional disputes has been graphically demonstrated by the equal treatment given to both factions of the feuding Communist Party of Belgium (Marxist-Leninist), which have visited China on separate occasions in 1971. This policy is also reflected in the even greater variety of parties whose messages of congratulations on the occasion of the CCP's 50th anniversary were published in the Chinese press in July 1971. This time, messages from the two competing factions of the Belgian party were printed, four from various Italian groups (including two from feuding factions of the formerly recognized PCI/ML), two from separate groups in the Netherlands,

*Some South American Marxist-Leninists went ahead with a regional conference anyway, which was held, but sparsely attended, on 4 September 1970, in Santiago, Chile. They afterward expressed disappointment that the Chinese refused to support the idea, and they indicated that no further meetings would be held.

- 38 -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

three from Germany, and two from Greece. As for Latin America, only a few messages were published, coming entirely from parties which apparently had little or no factional difficulties.

Little new information exists as yet on the implementation of ILD policy on financing of splinter groups as it was expounded in 1970.

25X1

It would appear that the ILD's stingy financial policy is still in effect.

There are good indications that China's relations with its Communist party and group allies are now subordinate to the process of improving the PRC's diplomatic status in the world. It has been noted that no congratulatory messages were published from pro-Chinese parties in some countries where China is attempting to improve diplomatic relations, Peru being a prime example. Neither was any 50th anniversary message published from the pro-Chinese Communist Party of Ceylon, the leader of which, N. Shanmugathasan, has always received the warmest welcome in Peking visits, and whose role in the

SECRET

25X1

25X1

recent disruptions in Ceylon is highly suspect.* China and Ceylon have seemed to be making other strides to improve state relations, and the CCP has repeatedly disavowed any connection between the insurgents and themselves. Although state relations with India have not been greatly improved, relatively little has been heard in the Chinese press recently about the pro-Maoist Naxalite insurgents, who were so warmly applauded during the Cultural Revolution.

Closer to home are the indicators of dwindling support for pro-Chinese Communist insurgent parties in Thailand, Burma and Malaysia. Active Chinese support for these insurgencies has been apparent for several years, with the Chinese supplying publicity and moral support, arms, training, sanctuary, and sometimes actual leadership to these fraternal parties. Leaders of these parties, particularly the Burma Communist Party/White Flag, have occasionally been seen in Peking, and seem to have residences there. Recently, the situation has been complicated by evidences of a warming trend in state relations with Burma and Malaysia.

25X1

*Shanmugathasan was arrested during the recent disorders, and there is some reason to believe that the CCP is annoyed with him. It seems likely that the Chinese, as a further disavowal of their involvement in the affair, have decided to avoid public displays of contact with the pro-Peking party for the time being.


- 40 -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1



25X1

It has also been noted that on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the CCP, the congratulatory messages to China from some insurgent groups in Southeast Asia outside Indochina were somewhat subdued; the BCP failed to take note of Chinese support and assistance for its struggle, as it had in previous years, and the Malayan Communist Party proclaimed only that "our enemies will never succeed in their attempt to undermine the revolutionary unity between the Malayan and Chinese Communist Parties..." It seems likely that the Chinese will apply the principles of "self-sufficiency" and "self-decision" a little more to some of their Asian allies, although they must be sensitive to the contradiction between their strong espousal of the concept of armed struggle and any notable decrease in support. But in any case, Chinese support for all secondary Party allies appears to be tempered by considerations of national interest, such as the attempt to improve overall diplomatic relations.

-41-

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

Personnel of the International Liaison DepartmentDirector**KENG PIAO****KENG PIAO**

Keng Piao, a full member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party since 1969, was first reported to be Director of the International Liaison Department (ILD) of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on 8 March 1971, when he accompanied Premier Chou En-lai on a visit to North Vietnam (DRV). This article was also the first public admission by the Chinese that a Party liaison department under the direction of the Central Committee had been reconstructed.

Keng was born in 1910 in Hunan, and was reportedly involved in underground Chinese Communist Party (CCP) activities as early as 1925. He was an officer in the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army by 1930, and rose rapidly through the ranks. In 1934 he was a divisional chief-of-staff in the 1st Front Army of Chu Te, then was transferred to the 4th Corps of the 4th Front Army, commanded then by Chang Kuo-tao and Hsu Hsiang-chien, with whom he participated in the Long March. After attending the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University

-43-

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

at Yen-an in 1937, he became a brigade commander in the 115th Division of the 8th Route Army, commanded by Lin Piao.*

Keng is one of the many present Chinese Communist foreign affairs officials who took part in the operations of the Marshall Mission to China in 1946. During the civil war period, he was chief-of-staff of the Shansi-Hopei-Chahar Military District, and later deputy commander of the 2nd Army Group of the North China Field Army under Yang Te-chih, later reorganized as the 19th Army Group.

His distinguished diplomatic career began soon after the formal establishment of the People's Republic of China. In June 1950, he was posted as China's first ambassador to Sweden, and in November of that year was named concurrent ambassador to Finland and Denmark, posts from which he was relieved in late 1954 and early 1955, respectively. In February 1956, Keng traded posts with the present vice-foreign minister Han Nien-lung, and became China's ambassador to Pakistan, where he participated in numerous events contributing to a warming of Sino-Pakistani relations. He held this post until December 1959, when he was recalled to Peking and appointed deputy foreign minister in charge of relations with the nations of Southeast Asia, Nepal and Pakistan.

25X1

-44-

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

[REDACTED]

In September 1963, Keng became ambassador to Burma, where he represented the PRC ably during the high-point of Sino-Burmese amicability. He was recalled in early 1967, and generally remained out of sight during the Cultural Revolution

[REDACTED]

25X1

Whatever "tests" Keng may have faced during the Cultural Revolution, he apparently passed with flying colors, as he was elected to the 9th Central Committee in April 1969 (one of only two ambassadors to attain this Party recognition), and in May was sent to what was then perhaps China's most important diplomatic post, the Chinese embassy in Albania. Keng was the first ambassador to be dispatched in the immediate post-Cultural Revolution period, a reflection of his esteem among the top CCP leadership.

In December 1970, Keng was recalled from Tirana to Peking, and until the announcement of his appointment to the ILD directorship, he was rumored to be in line for the Foreign Minister post apparently vacated by Chen Yi.

Since the March visit to Hanoi, Keng has been a busy man. He has met visiting Party delegations from the DRV, North Korea (DPRK), Chile, the Laotian Patriotic Front (LPF), the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front (NLF), New Zealand, Belgium, France and Rumania, sometimes accompanying the leaders on tours of China. He has travelled in high-level Chinese government/Party delegations to the DRV and DPRK, and has seen off other

-45-

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

Chinese delegations to Albania, Rumania, and DPRK. He has also attended numerous Communist embassy functions in Peking.*

Keng Piao's star seems to be definitely on the rise. Until recently, when he has begun to follow Kuo Mo-jo, Keng has been listed consistently as first after the Politburo members at various official functions, and at ILD functions, he is frequently listed right after Chou En-lai. On 12 August 1971, he received his own 'headline', being the main Chinese Communist personage meeting with a Belgian Marxist-Leninist Party delegation.

25X1

Keng Piao has to be considered one of China's most important, and most visible leaders in the foreign affairs apparent, and success in his new position may well lead to a higher Party position, perhaps even a seat on the Politburo.

*In one departure from standard protocol and custom, he met with a pro-Communist (if not Communist) American writer, William Hinton, on 24 July 1971, shortly after which Hinton published an authoritative-sounding article on Chinese policy towards the United States.

-46-

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

Deputy Directors: (the following designations are conjectural, not confirmed anywhere in the Chinese press)

JEN YUN-CHUNG

Jen Yun-chung is one of the more mysterious figures in the apparent upper levels of the ILD leadership. He was first listed in the press as a Deputy Political Officer of the Heilungkiang Military District, 1965-68. In February 1968, he was noted as having been transferred to an unidentified department of the central government (along with PLA leaders Kuo Yu-feng [see below in high-level Party personnel associated with the ILD] and Wang Liang-en, now an MFA "responsible person"). Thereafter, except for a virtual disappearance during 1969, Jen began to appear frequently with notable visiting Communist Party delegations. During late 1970, he made several appearances, mostly with visiting Rumanian delegations.* During this early period of ILD work, Jen was usually listed after Shen Chien (see below); recently, however, they have been listed first among the ILD functionaries rather alternately, with Jen being first more often than Shen, though in no obvious pattern. Jen's appearances have multiplied significantly in 1971, and particularly since Keng Piao's accession to the ILD directorship (corresponding to the unprecedented visibility of the department).** On 3 September 1971

*Total appearances - 13; in ILD functions after 20 November - 11.

**Through August he had made 65 public appearances, all but three dealing directly with ILD functions, and all but six after the March trip to Hanoi.

- 47 -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

NCNA listed him first among "leading members and staff members of the organizations concerned of the International Liaison Department." It is possible that he was originally brought in to form a revolutionary committee for the ILD, or perhaps as a military overseer of ILD affairs during the more chaotic period of the Cultural Revolution. During a May 1968 Kang Sheng speech to the Military Control Commission of the ILD, Jen was identified by name, and made a comment on reorganization work. Due to his consistent position as first or second among ILD functionaries at public appearances, it seems likely that he is a deputy director of the International Liaison Department, and he may be the senior deputy. He is still an active PLA member, appearing always in uniform at ILD functions.

SHEN CHIEN

Shen Chien is a long-standing veteran of the ILD, being one of the few who not only survived the Cultural Revolution, but made several public appearances in ILD functions during that time span when the disorganization of the central government in the Cultural Revolution was at its peak. He is also one of the four people, aside from Keng Piao, who has been specifically identified in open sources as "a leading member of the International Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party." His first identification of this type

**SHEN CHIEN**

- 48 -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

was on 1 May 1971, and the designation has recurred on several occasions since then.

25X1

On 14 September 1970, an official North Vietnamese newspaper Quan Doi Nhan Dan, in describing the reception of a DRV Party official visiting Peking, identified Shen as "Director of the Foreign Liaison Department of the Party Central Committee."

25X1

No further mention of Shen as Director appeared in 1970 or prior to Keng Piao's March 1971 appointment to that position.*

Shen Chien has had a long career in various capacities within the Chinese Communist foreign affairs apparatus. Born in Hopeh Province in 1915, he attended Peking Normal University and spent one year at Western Reserve University in the United States (probably in 1947). In 1949, he was reported to be Director of the General Administrative Office Secretariat of the People's Revolutionary Military Council. In October 1950, he was appointed to be a counselor to the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi, India, a post which he held until 1955. From 1955 to 1960, he served as Deputy Director of the American and Australian Affairs Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). He was sent in November 1960

*Some observers tie Shen's fate closely to that of Kang Sheng on the basis of such reports and feel that Shen's failure to be appointed publicly to the ILD post may reflect Kang's decline. But Shen has not gone into eclipse; he has continued to be a very visible and active participant in ILD functions, apparently at a very high level.

- 49 -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

[redacted]

as ambassador to Cuba, where he remained until he was replaced by Wang Yu-ping in January 1964. He was mentioned briefly in December 1964 as Vice-President of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, and in some capacity escorted Che Guevara during his visit to China in early 1965.

[redacted] Shen was heavily criticized during the Cultural Revolution but was restored to favor after proper self-criticism. Although his name is not mentioned in the reports of early disruptions within the ILD, during which, in 1965-66, much of its top leadership was removed, it is likely that Shen was in political trouble during the period of his disappearance. However, by the time the foreign affairs apparatus began to undergo its most severe shakeups, and during which time most of the rest of the ILD leadership went down, Shen seems to have re-emerged in good standing. His first public reappearance was to welcome Hsieh Fu-chih and his delegation back from their ordeal at Wuhan in July 1967, and he has continued to make public appearances at ILD functions without interruption ever since that time.

[redacted]

25X1

25X1

In addition to his ILD responsibilities, Shen is also President of the China-Cuba Friendship Association, and has been called upon to participate in numerous activities in that capacity. Shen is the most active of the known ILD members, and has been for some time. He is probably a deputy director; he greets nearly every major Communist Party delegation that visits China, and often accompanies them on tours of the country.

[redacted]

25X1

Unlike some other ILD officers, he seems to have no geographic area specialization [redacted]

25X1

- 50 -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

he rarely attends functions for European Marxist-Leninists. He attends some functions that no other ILD personality attends, such as various DPRK and DRV embassy receptions in Peking. In 1970, he made at least 73 public appearances, four as President of the China-Cuba Friendship Association, 22 with DRV or NLFSV delegations, 20 with DPRK delegations, 19 with Rumanian or Albanian groups, and six in miscellaneous capacities, some with other foreign Communist Parties. In 1971, he had made at least 117 appearances as of 31 August, 28 with DPRK delegations, 24 with Vietnamese or Laotian delegations, 39 with Rumanian or Albanian delegations, 12 with miscellaneous Communist Parties, eight as President of the China-Cuba Friendship Association, and six miscellaneous appearances.*

YANG YU-HENG

Yang Yu-heng has been reported as a Deputy Director of the ILD. He is a little-known figure. He was first identified as a "responsible person" of an unidentified PLA department (possibly its foreign liaison department) in 1960, then began making public appearances at ILD functions in September 1969. He has met many of the known Communist Party visitors to China since that time,

*Some observers regard Shen Chien as possibly holding a concurrent post as head of the Chinese Communist Investigation Department.

25X1

- 51 -

SECRET

25X1

25X1

although it would appear that he has been declining in importance since Keng's appointment as director. Whereas previously he was invariably listed along with (but after) Shen Chien in greeting important delegations, recently he has been absent from functions of the type at which he appeared in 1970, such as the June 1971 visit of Rumania's state and Party leader Nicolae Ceausescu. Instead Yang has been seen with delegations of fairly low priority and prestige, such as youth groups, along with new and low-ranking members of the ILD. Although he did not appear with other ILD members at the 1971 May Day celebrations, he was listed after Jen Yun-chung and Shen Chien at the 1971 celebration of the anniversary of the PLA on August 1. His present status, therefore, is uncertain.

Yang also has not seemed to have any geographic specialization, although recently he has met few delegations other than Indochinese and Albanian. There is some speculation that he is a member of the security apparatus.

CHANG TSANG

Chang Tsang is one of the most shadowy figures in the ILD, mainly because, unlike any of the other persons herein discussed, he has never made a public appearance.

25X1

- 52 -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

25X1

CHANG HSIANG-SHAN

Chang Hsiang-shan has been identified as a member of the ILD [redacted] in open materials. He was identified in People's Daily as a "leading functionary of the International Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party" on 14 May 1971, when he accompanied a trade union delegation from the DPRK on a tour of China.

25X1

25X1

Chang is unquestionably a veteran of ILD affairs, [redacted] a likely member of the department. Born in [redacted]

25X1

25X1

- 53 -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

Chekiang Province in 1914, Chang became "visible" in 1950, when he was reported as the Director of the Marx-Lenin Institute in Peking. He attended the British Communist Party Congress in 1959, and continued to be active in liaison affairs thereafter, particularly in front organizations such as the World Peace Council and the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization. Chang also travelled to Japan on several occasions, and was a member of Liu Ning-i's 1965 delegation to an anti-nuclear bomb conference in Japan -- a delegation which was denied entry with great publicity. He had also been denied entry to Japan when he travelled there with Peng Chen to attend a JCP congress in 1964. On that occasion, he was identified as "Chief of the Japanese Affairs Section, International Department of the CCP Politburo." Chang is also the director of the Asia-Africa Society of China.

Nothing is known of Chang's status or activities during the Cultural Revolution, though it could be assumed that, due to his close association with Peng Chen, Liu Ning-i, and other ILD leaders, he probably came under some fire. However, he survived, reappeared in 1969, and has been active in ILD functions ever since. Though he has met Communist delegations from many countries, he seems primarily concerned with Asian nations, particularly North Korea and Japan. Though his status as a Deputy Director is open to question, his ILD affiliation is not, and he may be in charge of a (hypothetical) bureau for Japan/Korea affairs. Recently, he has been seen most often with visiting groups of Japanese "friends."

- 55 -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

Other Known Members

TANG MING-CHAO

TANG MING-CHAO

Tang Ming-chao is another of the few persons who has been associated with the ILD in open source material. On 6 May 1971, Tang was identified as a "leading functionary" of the ILD, accompanying the Secretary-General of the New Zealand Communist Party (CPNZ), V.G. Wilcox.

25X1

Tang has had perhaps one of the more varied and interesting careers of the known ILD members. Born in Kwangtung Province in 1910, he was educated at Tsinghua University, then in 1934 moved to the United States. He spent 16 years in the US, where he attended the University of California, became a citizen, edited a Chinese-language newspaper, and even did some work for the US Army (in 1944). He returned to the Mainland in 1950 and became active in Chinese "peace" delegation activities and the Chinese People's Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. He was also active in the National People's Congress, the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, and was editor of China Reconstructs in 1962. After 1963, he was referred to as a leading member of an (unidentified) department of the Central Committee. He disappeared during the Cultural Revolution, but, unlike his longtime friend and suspected ILD associate Lin Tang, he survived it. He re-emerged in April 1970

- 57 -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

and has been making numerous appearances at ILD functions since that time.

If it is warranted to assume that the ILD is functionally organized similarly to the MFA, Tang could probably be considered to be head of the West Europe and Australo-American Affairs section of the ILD. If so, it is probably due primarily to his fluency in English and his past experience. He has appeared with Communist delegations from Belgium, New Zealand, Great Britain, Australia, Italy, France and the United States. Recently, he has met with delegations from a US Black Workers' Conference and with William Hinton. In the early 1960s, he did a considerable amount of foreign travel to World Peace Congress and Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization conferences and various Communist Party congresses. He is now with Peking's UN delegation.

MAO PAO-CHUNG

Mao Pao-chung first appeared in ILD-type functions in October 1968, when he had contacts with DRV and Albanian Communists. He then disappeared from public view until March 1971, when he began to make appearances with Indochinese Communists from the Laotian Patriotic Front, North Vietnamese Workers Party, and NLFSV. He has appeared very frequently since then, with several important visiting Communist Party delegations. He seems, however, to be primarily concerned with North Vietnamese Communists, and could be placed in the Indochina section, if such exists, of the ILD. His presence at other functions may indicate that he is head of that bureau. He was listed second among "leading members and staff members" of the ILD, who met with a French Marxist-Leninist group on 3 September 1971, and again with a JCP (L) group one week later.

- 58 -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

CHAO HSUEH-LI

Chao Hsueh-li, who was formerly in the Chinese embassy in Switzerland (1965-1968), has recently met visiting Belgian and French Marxist-Leninist Party delegations. On 10 September 1971, he was identified in a NCNA release as a "leading functionary" of the ILD, accompanying the French delegation on a tour of China. With his previous experience, it is conceivable that Chao is the head of a West European subsection of Tang Ming-chao's ex-bureau.

TIEN SHU-CHIEN

Tien Shu-chien is one of the many new faces in the ILD, making his first public appearance in April 1971, when he greeted a delegation from Japan. On 11 May 1971, he was identified as a "responsible working person" of the ILD, while accompanying a DPRK Trade Union delegation visiting China along with Chang Hsiang-shan. He has since appeared several times, almost always in connection with Korean delegations or Chinese delegations going to Korea, leading to the conclusion that he is perhaps a Korean interpreter for the ILD. He may be higher than that, however, since he has more recently appeared with a Vietnamese group.

YANG CHUN-CHENG

Yang Chun-cheng was also identified as a "responsible working person" for the ILD during the May 1971 visit of the Korean trade union delegation. He has since appeared exclusively with known ILD members,

- 59 -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

solely in connection with DPRK affairs. He appears to be an interpreter, Korean, perhaps in Chang Hsiang-shan's department for Japan/Korea Affairs.

HSIAO HUANG

Hsiao Huang, another new ILD functionary, began to make numerous appearances along with other ILD personalities in March 1971. He has appeared almost exclusively with VWP, NLFSV, and LPF delegations, indicating that he is either a Vietnamese interpreter, or, more likely, in the Indochina Bureau of the ILD. On 10 September 1971, he was listed after known ILD members Jen Yun-chung and Mao Pao-chung in meeting a JCP(L) group.

YAO SHIH-KEN

Yao Shih-ken has met delegations from Belgian and French Marxist-Leninist parties, KWP, VWP, and NLFSV. He is probably a low-level functionary, being last in the 3 September 1971 listing of "leading members and staff members of the organizations concerned of The International Liaison Department of the CCP Central Committee."

-60-

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

Other Possible ILD Members

25X1

TSAO I-OU

Tsao I-ou is a full member of the Central Committee, and is perhaps best known as the wife of Kang Sheng, the former Politburo supervisor and probably virtual director of the ILD during the Cultural Revolution. Tsao began to make public appearances in ILD functions soon after her 'coming-out' in 1966, during the early stages of the Cultural Revolution. Throughout the Cultural Revolution, she greeted nearly all the important Communist and Marxist-Leninist delegations who visited China, along with Kang and Kuo Yu-feng (see below). In a 1970

25X1

Tsao was praised highly and identified as a leading member of the "reorganization committee" concerned with -- or one of -- the CCP's central departments.

25X1

After Kang Sheng's disappearance in late November 1970, Tsao's public appearances became less frequent, although she has continued to appear in evident favor. In April 1971, she met with V.G. Wilcox and his CPNZ delegation, and in June she was present at the meeting

-61-

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

between Ceausescu and Mao, Lin Piao and Kang. She must still be considered a possible member of the ILD, though perhaps a rather inactive one.*

FENG HSUAN

Feng Hsuan qualifies for the list of ILD members by virtue of his past experience, his appearances, and his previous identifications as a working member of the ILD. The British China Topics of 21 January 1966 places him on the ILD

**FENG HSUAN**

25X1

Feng was born in 1915 in Kiangsu Province, taught at 'Kang Ta' University in Yen-an in 1947, and became ambassador to Switzerland in 1956, having served as 'minister' there since 1950. Relieved of his ambassadorial post in 1959, he returned to China and became Deputy Secretary-General of the State Council, a post which he held until March 1965. In the same period, he

*In August 1971, she met a non-Communist Congolese women's delegation, indicating that her ILD connection may be over.

- 62 -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

appeared to hold some post in the central political security apparatus. In March/April 1966, he accompanied Liu Shao-chi and Chen Yi to Pakistan while the Cultural Revolution was gathering steam. That was his last recorded appearance until June 1970, when he met an Albanian government/Party delegation.

Feng is rather a tentative member of the ILD, and still makes frequent appearances in MFA-type functions. However, whenever he appears at a major Party gathering, such as meeting an important delegation or on National Day, he always appears along with known ILD members, often listed immediately after Shen Chien. He may be in a post for coordination with the MFA, or with whatever political security apparatus now exists, or with the Investigation Department (foreign intelligence). Liao Ho-shu places Feng as deputy director of the Investigation Department, but there is no confirmation of this.

CHU TA-CHENG

Chu is a suspected ILD member

25X1

He is identified in the press as a "responsible person" of an unidentified department of the Central Committee. Chu appeared in September 1969, and began making numerous appearances at ILD functions, listed always after Shen Chien and Yang Yuheng. After January 1971, Chu dropped out of sight, but he reappeared, in apparent favor, in November 1971. Chu, like Jen Yun-chung, was mentioned by name in a 1968 Red Flag report of Kang Sheng's speech to the Military Control Group of the "XX Department" (apparently the ILD), indicating that he has a PLA background,

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

and may have later become a member of a revolutionary committee in the ILD. His present post is unknown; it is uncertain whether he is still an active ILD member.

LIU KE-MING

Liu Ke-ming has been reported as a member of the "1st Bureau" of the ILD, dealing with Soviet and East European affairs. He was mentioned in the Rumanian press as the "deputy general secretary of the foreign relations department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China" on 2 September 1970. It would appear that he still holds this type of position, judging by his recent public appearances. During the past two years, his only public appearances have been with Party delegations to or from Albania and Rumania, the most notable being his presence during the meeting between Nicolae Ceausescu and Mao Tse-tung in June 1971. He has, however, made only seven appearances thus far in 1971, which could lead to some doubt as to his position.

LIU CHUN-FA

Liu Chun-fa has apparently been with the ILD since sometime in 1969, as he began to meet delegations from the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front (NLFSV) in September of that year, and also sent his condolences to the DRV embassy in Peking on the death of Ho Chi Minh. He made only one appearance in 1970, but reappeared in June and July of 1971, meeting Rumanian and Korean delegations. There is hardly enough information even to speculate on his position, although his ILD affiliation would seem probable from his repeated public appearances with known ILD members.

- 64 -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

MA TE-CHUAN

Ma Te-chuan is another new face with the ILD, having made his first (and last-known) appearances in April-May 1971, when he met Party delegations from Belgium, New Zealand, and Laos. Taiwan's monthly Studies on Chinese Communism identified Ma as an ILD functionary in its June 1971 issue (page 143). However, too little information is available to do more than speculate on Ma's functional or hierarchical position.

HSING CHU-FANG

Hsing Chu-fang was also identified [redacted] as being an ILD functionary in June 1971. Although he was apparently a writer, having published in Chung kuo Ching-nien (China Youth) magazine in 1964, Hsing did not begin to appear publicly until April 1971, when he met Party delegations from New Zealand and Belgium. Since then, he has met delegations from the VWP and KWP. Again, not enough information exists to support speculation.

25X1
25X1**HUANG CHUN**

If it is reasonable to assume that the ILD would have its own staff of interpreters, then Huang Chun can also be presumed to be an ILD functionary. He first appeared in May 1971, and was listed as an interpreter. All his subsequent appearances have been with known or suspected ILD personnel, always among the last listed, and always with a Vietnamese group of some type or another. He can probably be placed in the Indochina bureau as a Vietnamese interpreter.

- 65 -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

LIN HSIEN-NUNG

Another new face in the ILD crowd whose position is hard to estimate is Lin Hsien-nung, who first began to appear in ILD functions in March 1971. Since then he has met Party delegations from New Zealand, Chile, Rumania, DRV, DPRK, and LPF. He has also seen off a Chinese workers' delegation to Rumania.

HUNG TSO-CHUN

Hung Tso-chun has also appeared (since June 1971) exclusively in the company of ILD members, greeting delegations from DRV and NLFSV. He may be in the Indo-china Bureau.

CHANG CHEN-HAI

Chang Chen-hai was first identified in 1968 as a responsible person of the Canton MRC. He has met Party delegations from Belgium, DPRK, KPF, and has seen off a Chinese delegation to Albania. The nature of his connection to the ILD is not known, but he has usually been listed among known or strongly suspected members.

-66-**SECRET**

25X1

SECRET

25X1

**Other Persons Seen Often in Company of ILD Personalities
at ILD Functions**

CHENG KUO-TSAI

Recent appearances only with LPF delegation
-- possibly an interpreter, Laotian.

CHIN HUI

Probably a Korean interpreter; met General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea delegation in May 1971, and accompanied a Chinese youth delegation to Korean Youth Conference in June 1971.

LAO YUAN-HUI

Probably an interpreter, English. Has appeared with CPNZ's Wilcox in May 1971, and with delegation from US Black Workers Congress in July.

LI MEI

A recent appearance -- may be same Li Mei active in Overseas Chinese affairs in early 1960s.

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

LI KUEI-CHENG

With LPF delegation in July 1971.

LI MING-HSIANG

With LPF delegation in July 1967 (with Yang Yu-heng).

LI WEN-KUN

Met NLFSV and VWP delegations in June 1971.

SHIH YUNG-LU

Appeared with ILD members greeting delegations from NLFSV and VWP, May/June 1971.

TAI SHENG-PU

Attended CPNZ Congress with Liu Ning-i and Tang Ming-chao in 1966, then disappeared. Recently re-emerged to greet Wilcox during his April 1971 visit to China.

- 68 -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

High-Level Party Personnel Often Associated with ILD**KANG SHENG**

Among his many other duties and responsibilities as a (onetime) member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Central Committee, Kang Sheng seems to have been responsible for the ILD, its personnel and operations. [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED] it seems clear that, from about 1965-1966 until his disappearance in November 1970, Kang was the man ultimately in charge of implementing Mao's policies toward "fraternal" Communist Parties. He met every Communist Party/government delegation from China's major allies, and nearly all of the known Marxist-Leninist splinter Party delegations that visited China. In addition, he travelled to Albania in 1966 to a Party meeting there. [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED] Chinese Communist Party personnel in connection with liaison work list Kang Sheng as the head of the ILD (or Politburo-level supervisor), usually in charge of briefing the visiting delegations on CCP and PCR policy and activities.

25X1

25X1

Kang, who had a leading role in Party-rebuilding at least until late 1969, was in charge of the reorganization of the ILD after its top leadership was purged or criticized in the Cultural Revolution. In a speech carried in the Canton Red Flag Bulletin (Hung-ch'i T'ung-hsin) of July 1968, Kang addressed himself to the problems of reforming the "XX Ministry" (clearly the ILD, since Wang Chia-hsiang, Wu Hsiu-chuan, Chao I-min and Liu Ning-i are mentioned as former leaders) through the

- 69 -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

application of Mao's thought.* An earlier Red Guard poster, noted on 12 May 1967, reported other incidents in which Kang showed concern with the internal workings of the ILD, namely condemning Wu Hsiu-chuan and defending Liu Ning-i (appointed as head of the ILD in March 1966). In a briefing to Chilean Communist delegates in July 1970, Kang again discussed the reorganization of the ILD. During some of the more chaotic periods of the ILD's Cultural Revolution experience, Kang may have served as the actual head of the department.

Kang's actual influence on the activities and policies of the ILD are difficult to determine. It is apparent that policy changes were made similar to those made in other departments during the Cultural Revolution, namely drawing policies and operations more closely within limits determined by Mao's ideology. Ideological purity (by Maoist standards) began to be stressed more heavily. In line with post-Cultural Revolution Maoist ideology and tactics, various Parties began to be urged by Kang to become more self-sufficient and less reliant on financial aid and political advice from China.

Kang Sheng's decline after the winter of 1969-70 apparently has affected the ILD. Great changes appear to have been made in the organization and functions of the department since Kang has been gone. A new director has been appointed, a man with no known relationship to Kang Sheng, and Kang's own proteges (with the exception of Shen Chien) seem to have been quietly removed from positions of influence within the department. It is believed by some observers that the ILD is now a much

*Jen Yun-chung and Chu Ta-cheng made comments during the speech, which is described as being delivered to the "Military Control Group of the XX Ministry on May 30, 1968."

- 70 -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

more influential department, in terms of actual formulation of foreign policy, than it used to be. Keng Piao is apparently the ranking Party member -- under Chou En-lai -- in the foreign affairs apparatus. Kang is presumed to have no current influence over the policies or personnel of the ILD.

KUO YU-FENG

In his July 1970 [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] Kang Sheng mentioned that Kuo Yu-feng was part of the "Central Committee Reorganization Team," along with Kang's wife, Tsao I-ou. Other reports, as well as his position in name-lists, seem to indicate that he is high up in the Central Committee Organization Department, perhaps even head of that body. His connection with the ILD was primarily during the 1969-70 reorganization period [redacted]

25X1

25X1

He also participated in the briefing of the visiting delegation. Furthermore, Kuo was very visible in the open press during 1969-70, performing ILD functions along with Kang Sheng, Tsao I-ou and Shen Chien, meeting Party delegations from several European and Asian countries.

Kuo is a PLA officer, first noted in 1958 in Lushun as a political officer and reported transferred to Peking in May 1968, where he began to appear as a "responsible person" on the Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee. He was named an alternate member of the Central Committee in April 1969. In 1971, he ceased to be listed with the known ILD members, and ceased appearing at ILD functions (the last being greeting the British Marxist-Leninist Party on their tour of China in December 1970). Since then, he has been [redacted] the Director of

25X1

- 71 -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

the Organization Department. It would appear that, with the ILD now a going concern under a reliable man, Kuo's presence in the ILD is no longer required.

**YAO WEN-YUAN****YAO WEN-YUAN**

During the course of his spectacular rise in the hierarchy of the CCP, Politburo member and Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee Yao Wen-yuan has taken on a number of important responsibilities in addition to his official Shanghai duties. The most important of these has been the supervision of the regime's entire propaganda apparatus. However, one of his new responsibilities has been meeting with Party delegations that

visit Peking from other countries. Yao began to appear at ILD-type functions with Kang Sheng during October 1970, and has continued attending such functions in the absence of the latter. After a two-month absence from Peking in early 1971, during which time he was in Shanghai, Yao continued to meet both high-level and low-level foreign Communist delegations, often along with ILD members. In nearly every case, he has been mentioned as being a participant in any substantive discussions that took place between the Chinese and their visitors. This was notable during the Ceausescu visit to China in June 1971. It is possible that, in spite of Keng Piao's Party position, it is still considered necessary for the ILD to have a Politburo-level supervisor. If so, Yao may be that supervisor, perhaps with help from Chang Chun-chiao. Although Yao's only travel experience outside of

- 72 -

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

China was in a Red Guard delegation to Albania, which he led in 1967, many observers believe that Yao has taken over Kang's role.

CHANG CHUN-CHIAO

Chang Chun-chiao, Politburo member and 1st Secretary of the Shanghai Party Committee, is also frequently present in Peking, and often in attendance at ILT functions. Though he is of slightly higher rank than Yao Wen-yuan (they are respectively fifth and sixth among active Politburo members) and is always listed before Yao whenever the two are together at a foreign affairs function, it would appear that, at least as far as liaison work is concerned, Yao is somewhat more closely concerned. In particular, while Chang often meets with important foreign delegations, and sometimes escorts them around China, Yao Wen-yuan is invariably listed as being present during the actual discussions, whereas Chang almost never is. Chang has met delegations, beginning about October 1970, from New Zealand, DPRK, DRV, NLFSV, Rumania, Cambodia (Sihanouk), Japan, and the US (Hinton). However, his participation in ILT functions is sporadic, and his presence may be more due to his Party rank than ILT affiliation.

WU FA-HSIEN

Wu Fa-hsien, the portly, frog-faced commander of the PLA Air Force and Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA, was making appearances at foreign affairs, and particularly ILT functions, from about 1967 until his apparent fall in September 1971. In 1969, he was mentioned by Kang Sheng, in a briefing to a foreign Communist delegation, as one of the outstanding members

- 73 -

SECRET

25X1

~~SECRET~~

25X1

of the new Central Committee, along with Tsao I-ou (Kang's wife) Kuo Yu-feng, and Shen Chien. Even in Kang's absence, Wu continued to make frequent appearances along with ILD members. He was the only military member of the Politburo to do so consistently.

CHI TENG-KUEI

Chi Teng-kuei, an alternate member of the CCP Politburo and a deputy secretary of the Honan Provincial Party Committee, is a little-known figure. Since 1970, he has frequently appeared at foreign affairs and ILD functions. He was tapped by Mao himself for the Politburo, and may be close to Chou En-lai. He has also been associated with Keng Piao in briefing visiting Communist delegations, and open sources have noted his frequent performance of liaison duties.

CHANG SHIH-CHUNG

Chang Shih-chung was named an alternate member of the Central Committee in April 1969, as a representative of the "workers." He has also been selected as a member of the Peking Party Committee and was a leading member of the Conference of Representatives of Peking Revolutionary Workers. His connection to the ILD seems to be in his consistent appearance with workers' delegations which visit China, particularly from Communist countries. He has also met Communist Party delegations from Great Britain, Albania, and Rumania, as well as the Hinton group from the US.

- 74 -

~~SECRET~~

25X1

SECRET

25X1

If Chang is not an actual member of the ILD, which he may well be, it could be speculated that he holds or will hold an important rank in a liaison position in the All-China Federation of Trade Unions if and when it is officially reorganized.

LIU HSI-CHANG

Liu Hsi-chang is another member of the Peking Municipal Committee and the Conference of Representatives of Peking Revolutionary Workers who has had some dealings with ILD members at foreign affairs functions. Rising through the ranks of Revolutionary Rebels during the Cultural Revolution, he was elected as a "worker" representative to the 9th Central Committee. His liaison work has consisted of meeting various Communist Party delegations, seeing worker delegations off to various Communist allies nations (he was himself in a delegation led by Yao Wen-yuan to Albania in 1967), and meeting trade union delegations visiting China. His exact relation to the ILD cannot be estimated at this time, but it is perhaps significant that he has made so many appearances with known ILD personnel.

-75-

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

ANNEX

The following is a list of former known or conjectured members of the International Liaison Department purged or missing during and after the Cultural Revolution.

WANG Chia-hsiang -- former head of early ILD, in jeopardy after Lushan 1959, purged early in Cultural Revolution.

WU Hsiu-chuan -- acting head of department during Wang's disgrace. Purged 1966.

LIU Ning-i -- named director in March 1966. Purged January 1968 and dropped from CC in 1969.

CHAO I-min -- probably deputy director under Liu and perhaps before. Purged September 1967.

WANG Li -- in charge of "anti-revisionism" in department. Purged noisily, autumn 1967.

HSU Li -- reportedly deputy director for Administration, purged in 1965.

CHANG Shang-ming -- reportedly head of Asia section. Purged early with Hsu Li.

CHAO An-po -- Japan section. Undergoing re-education.

A-1

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

YE H Hu-sheng	--	Soviet section.
LIAO Cheng-chiao	--	India-Pakistan-Ceylon section.
CHUANG Tao	--	Japan section. Last seen 1970.
TIEN Fu	--	reception section.
CHEN Hua	--	General Office, perhaps cadre section. Purged early with Hsu, Chang.
LI Chu-li	--	Reported Secretary-General 1965. Purged 1968.
CHANG Chi-ming	--	missing.
CHEN Tan-nan	--	missing.
CHU Shih-lun	--	missing.
HO Hsi-chuan	--	missing.
HSIUNG Fu	--	attended several foreign Party congresses. Purged February 1967.
LI Chi-hsin	--	identified in 1966-68 reports on the ILD. Missing.
LI Hsi-san	--	contacts with Latin American Parties in early 1960s. Missing.
LIN Tang	--	close associate of Tang Ming-chao. Missing.
WU Hsueh-chien	--	Afro-Asian Solidarity Ctte & Youth organizations. Missing.

A-2

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

YU Chih-ying -- trade union organizer; contacts
with New Zealand and Australia
CPs. Apparently purged with
Liu Ning-i.

WANG Wen-chung -- missing.

CHANG Chi-lung -- missing.

KUAN Yuan* -- also in organization dept.?
Dropped from Central Committee
in 1969.

CHAO Han* -- also in organization dept.?
Purged in 1968.

CHEN Yeh-ping* -- organization department? Denounced
in 1967.

25X1

A-3

SECRET

25X1